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The purpose of this research was to examine the truth behind the perception that the AIM 
market was systematically more risky than the Official List (OL) market in comparable stocks. 
The main finding of the research is that while at a superficial level AIM stocks may seem more 
risky than comparable OL stocks, as the analysis is refined to ensure that the comparisons 
focus purely on the effect of being on different markets the difference shrinks and finally 
disappears. This conclusion concurs with the current market practitioner view that there is no 
significant risk differential. 
 
AIM has been a considerable success. Even by its survival over 10 years it has succeeded in 
relation to similar markets in other countries. During that period it has seen rapid growth and 
during the last 5 years has emerged as the market of choice for smaller, newer companies in 
the UK and increasingly beyond the UK.  
 
The research comprised three elements – an interview program, a literature review and an 
extensive  empirical  analysis  using  5  years  of  high frequency  trading  data. The  interview 
program suggested four conclusions: 
 
•  While AIM has less demanding minimum requirements than the OL (for example in terms of 
free float) the Nominated Advisors almost always insist that new AIM companies exceed 
minimum standards, in practice, are similar to those of the OL. 
•  While AIM, in its earlier days may have been more risky, its growth in recent years and the 
diversity of companies attracted to the market mean that risk is now much lower and AIM 
companies are not significantly different in risk terms from comparable companies on the 
OL. 
•  Age (since admission) of company is an important factor in determining risk, but after a 
relatively short time, perhaps 2 to 3 years, its importance disappears. 
•  In the AIM (and OL) market there is segmentation between larger, investable companies 
and a non-investable group – typically very small companies. The non-investable portion is 
high-risk by its nature and because it is difficult to trade.  
 
The literature review showed a surprising lack of research into small cap markets. Fifty-four 
published pieces were identified, most of which related to the now defunct Neuer Markt and/or 
to IPO pricing. The main relevant results from the review were that: 
•  Switches between markets have not been associated with changes in risk 
•  There are a number of risk-related characteristics of companies – in particular, size, age 
and industry – that tend to be related to market. 
 
Whole market analyses of comparable stocks that did not switch markets. 
•  Simple ratio analysis comparing the annual volatility of AIM and OL stocks showed AIM to 
be substantially more volatile than the OL - ranging from 2 to 3 times that of comparable OL 
stocks. 
•  Normalising for the age difference to exclude the age effect. The results suggested that 
larger stocks are considerably more volatile than smaller stocks and also that AIM stocks 
were significantly more volatile than comparable OL stocks. 
•  Multi-variate regression analysis used the main risk-related variables (size, industry, age 
and market) to explain differences in volatility.  Results suggested that AIM stocks were 
significantly more volatile, though the difference was far smaller than that given by the 
simple ratio analysis. However the strong correlation between age and market makes it 
difficult for a regression to distinguish the impact of the two variables.  
  
 
A significant number of stocks (160) have moved between the two markets. These allowed 
study of a single event, a market switch, abstracting from other company-specific factors. Again 
a succession of progressively more complex analyses were applied  
 
•  Simple switchers analysis using ratios of pre and post-switch volatility to assess the impact 
of the switch with the following results: 
o  OL to AIM switchers, 55% of these have greater volatility on AIM.  
o  AIM to the OL, 45% of these have greater volatility on AIM.  
o  Overall switching stocks showed 10% higher volatility on AIM 
 
These results are consistent with the notion that AIM is viewed as slightly more risky.  
 
A more complex analysis of the switchers was conducted by using high-frequency data to 
construct GARCH models studying the dynamics of volatility. In this analysis, 11% of the 
switchers show a significant change in volatility with a majority showing lower volatility in the 
AIM period. 
 
This analysis was extended in two ways 
 
•  Including risk-free principal trades (crosses done through market makers). These were a 
significant part of trading and proportionately more important for AIM. The effect is to 
smooth the price history of stocks consistent with the use of risk-free principal trades to 
reduce price impact. The results were: 
o  19% of switchers had higher volatility in the AIM period 
o  42% had lower volatility in the AIM period 
•  Applying more robust significance tests – i.e. being more demanding in deciding whether 
statistically small difference represented real differences. The results were: 
o  Only 1% of switchers showed increased volatility in the AIM period 
o  Almost 10% showed lower volatility in the AIM period 
 
The main conclusion that comes out of this analysis is that the perception that AIM has higher 
volatility than the OL is perfectly understandable, but incorrect. Our simpler analyses generally 
found a large difference between volatility of AIM and OL stocks. However as we moved to more 
complex analyses differences in volatility between AIM and the OL are very small, usually not 
significant statistically and tend, if anything, to indicate a slightly lower volatility when on AIM. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
Copyright 2006 Board, Dufour, Sutcliffe and Wells    4
     
1  Introduction 
The AIM market has been a considerable success for the London Stock Exchange. Since its 
opening in 1995 it has grown steadily to reach over 1,000 listed companies with a market value 
exceeding £30bn by the end of 2004. This success has come even though recent years have 
not been kind to most second-tier markets and several have closed. AIM’s success is said to be 
partly a reflection of the regulatory standards and also because it’s marketing has targeted a 
wide range of companies rather than focussing on high-tech companies which have suffered 
since 2000. 
 
The ICMA Centre at the University of Reading was commissioned to conduct a study into the 
continuing perception that AIM, although buoyant, remains riskier than corresponding stocks on 
the LSE’s Official List, OL, although AIM stocks can obviously be expected to be more risky than 
blue-chip stocks.  
2  Activities 
The project team undertook three distinct activities: 
1.  A brief interview program among selected market participants. The purpose of this was not 
to gain an exhaustive understanding of the AIM market, but to gain an indication of factors 
that are relevant in looking at the risk of AIM stocks. 
2.  A review of the academic literature relating to smaller company markets. The objective of 
this review is to summarise existing, related research and to gain insights into the factors 
that might be relevant in assessing and explaining risk. 
3.  An empirical study of the volatility of returns in the two markets. The empirical study was 
the main element of the research which was guided by information gathered from the 
literature and interviews. Our empirical approach was conditioned by our wish to examine 
the question of “perceived” risk and we therefore undertook a number of analyses of 
increasing sophistication designed first to identify apparent risk and then to see whether 
any apparent risk persisted through more sophisticated examination.  We therefore looked 
at the following: 
a.  Basic analysis of relative volatility; 
b.  Basic analysis with allowance for size, age and liquidity; 
c.  Regression analyses with multiple variables; 
d.  Analysis of stocks that switched from one market to the other (“switchers”); 
e.  A more sophisticated analysis of switchers using GARCH procedures; 
f.  Variations on this to include statistical estimation of the effects. 
  The results of these tests are presented in sections 7 onwards. 
3  Interviews 
The short interview program covered brokers, dealers and fund managers. The interviews 
suggested a number of key factors to consider in the subsequent research: 
 
•  AIM Stocks can informally be divided into two groups: the larger “investable” companies 
and a non-investable group. The latter is high-risk both by nature and because it is very 
difficult to trade. A similar division exists in the corresponding section of the OL. 
  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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•  Age is an important factor, in that stocks which have been listed for less than two to three 
years are seen as riskier.  However, there is no difference in risk between stocks of greater 
age than this. 
 
•  In practice, nominated advisors impose requirements on AIM companies that are as 
demanding as those imposed on OL stocks. Advisors believe that investors, and their own 
reputation,  would  suffer  if  AIM  was  perceived  as  subject  to  lower  requirements.  In 
particular, while the free float requirements are lower on AIM the nominated advisors 
require new AIM companies to have the same free float as new OL companies. 
 
•  The end of the lock-in period and the exit of Venture Capitalists may cause volatility. 
However, the volatility around these events is mainly a function of a small number of large 
transactions and is short-lived as it reflects market impact rather than fundamentals.  
 
•  Historically AIM has been more risky, but this has been compensated by higher returns. 
More recently as AIM has matured and become a broader market the riskiness has 
reduced. Now there is little, if any, perceived difference in risk between AIM and the OL.  
 
•  In general, no criticism of AIM as a market place was offered.  It appears to be perceived as 
a success and was repeatedly cited as the market of choice for new issues.  
4  Literature review 
The full literature review is attached as Appendix A. The main findings are: 
 
•  There is almost no published research on risk in small cap markets. 
 
•  Our search found 54 empirical studies specifically of small cap markets which have been 
reviewed for this research. The studies have focussed on the mainland European markets, 
particularly the Neuer Markt (which has subsequently been closed). In addition there are 
studies of the NASDAQ market, but these tend to cover the range of stocks on NASDAQ 
(including many very large companies) and focus on differences in trading mechanisms 
between NASDAQ and other US equity markets. As such they are not relevant to this 
research. 
 
•  The main focus of much of the international research is IPOs and their pricing – reflecting 
the fact that issuance is the main purpose and function of many small cap markets and that 
many have not lasted long enough to support studies of volatility.  
 
•  Relatively little work has been conducted on the UK market.  There have been five studies 
of IPO pricing on the USM and two on techMARK. There have been no studies on IPOs 
specifically on the AIM market, and only one study looks at the volatility of AIM stocks 
(using 1996 data). 
 
•  A number of studies have investigated the change in total risk or systematic risk (beta) 
associated with movements of stocks from the small cap market to the main market. With 
one exception these studies look at movements from the Nasdaq OTC market to AMEX or 
the NYSE. These studies have not detected any effects.  
 
•  A number of studies of volatility, all relating to the Neuer Markt, have shown very high 
volatilities. However, these studies are poorly specified and none offers any comparative 
data for the main market. 
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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The literature did suggest a number of avenues for enquiry relating to differences between the 
AIM and OL markets: 
 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to be smaller than firms on the OL. It is well known that small 
capitalization firms have higher total risk than similar large capitalization firms. Small 
companies are less diversified than large companies, and may in extreme cases effectively 
be a bet on whether there is oil or gas at the bottom of a hole in the ground. Eckert (2002) 
found that German firms, who choose to list on the Neuer Markt, rather than the 1st Market 
Segment, are riskier, smaller and younger. 
 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to be younger than firms on the OL. Young firms tend to be riskier 
than well established firms because their business model may be unproven, and the staff 
less experienced. 
 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to be in industrial sectors, like mining and oil and gas, which are 
inherently risky. 
 
•  AIM has less stringent regulatory requirements than the OL. For example, on AIM there is 
no requirement for a minimum proportion of the shares to be in public hands, no trading 
record requirement, no requirement for shareholder approval of transactions, and no 
minimum market capitalization.  
 
•  Firms traded on AIM tend to be less liquid than those on the OL with less frequent trading, 
and this may result in fewer, larger price movements.  
 
•  The  steady  flow  of  information  to  the  market  may  be  less  well  developed  for  small 
capitalization companies. Small companies may make fewer announcements, leading to 
fewer, but larger, information disclosures. They may also be followed by fewer analysts, 
who discover and publicize relevant information on the firm. If risk is quantified using a 
measure such as the standard deviation of returns, then this lumpiness of the information 
flow will also increase measured risk.  
 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to have a smaller free float than firms on the OL. Since the ratio of 
tradable shares to total shares is lower for firms listed on AIM, the price impact of news 
tends to be larger for AIM companies, leading to higher measured risk. 
 
•  Firms listed on AIM are subject to the expiration of the lock-up period, which can lead to 
return volatility around the expiration date. 
 
•  Firms listed on AIM may be more highly geared than firms on the OL. In which case, even if 
the income streams of two companies are equally risky, the share price of the more highly 
geared company will be more volatile. 
 
•  Venture capitalists are more likely to be involved with firms listed on AIM, and they may 
create price volatility when they end their involvement.  
 
•  A trading mechanism involving market makers produces greater bid-ask bounce, leading to 
more volatile prices, than if prices are set by an order-driven process (e.g. SETS, SETS-
MM). Since small firms on AIM use market makers, while some firms on the OL use an 
auction mechanism (where bid-ask bounce will be smaller), AIM price volatility will be 
higher.  
 
•  If the distribution of returns for shares listed on AIM is more negatively skewed than for 
shares in the OL (i.e. AIM stocks have a higher proportion of large downward price ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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movements), there will be more big negative returns on AIM, and this may give the 
impression that AIM is riskier.  
 
Where the data allows, we have incorporated these avenues of enquiry into the empirical 
analysis. 
5  Preliminary data analyses 
The Stock Exchange supplied us with data on individual trades in AIM Stocks and in OL stocks 
for the five year period 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2004, and quote data for SEAQ stocks 
(all AIM stocks and most OL stocks at that time) for the same period.  In the event we decided 
not to use the quote data as experience suggests that for many less-liquid stocks the quotes are 
wide and vary infrequently. Most trading takes place at prices negotiated within the quotes so 
the trade data gives a more accurate picture of prices. 
 
We also obtained data from the LSE website showing entry date and industry group. The LSE 
also supplied data on stocks exiting from the AIM market including those that migrated to the 
OL. 
5.1  Data and sample selection 
The first step was to define a sample of AIM and OL stocks for analysis. Using data from the 
Exchange’s website we identified 1035 AIM stocks and 1460 OL stocks. This dataset was 
cleaned by removing: 
 
•  non-UK AIM stocks and fixed income OL stocks 
 
•  stocks which were shown as having zero market value.  
 
•  large OL companies. At the end of January 2005 the largest market value of an AIM 
company was £777m. We took £800 million as the cut-off for OL stocks. 
 
•  Investment Trusts and Other Financial industrial sectors. Investment trusts were strongly 
represented in the OL stock but almost absent on AIM, and the converse was true of Other 
Financials. These companies were different in that the Investment Trusts were generally 
conventional trusts investing in listed companies whereas the Other Financial in AIM 
appeared more like venture capital trusts, which might be expected to be more risky than 
conventional trusts. 
 
These removals resulted in the “eligible” sample of stocks shown in the following table. 
 
End Jan 2005    UK OL  AIM 
Total companies  1460  1035 
Less non-UK  -  120 
Less Fixed Interest  156  - 
Less Zero Market Value  52  18 
Less Market Value > £800m  203  - 
Less Eligible Inv Trusts (Ind’l sub-sector 850)  247  23 
Less Ineligible Inv Tsts (Ind’l sub-sector 890)  156  3 
Less Other Fin (Ind’l sub-sector 879)  17  110 
Sample “Eligible” stocks  629   761 
 
Taking these stocks we conducted some basic analyses. Our intention was to try and identify 
groups of stocks, which were similar in terms of variables that had been suggested as important ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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determinants of risk but were differentiated by market segment. The variables that have been 
suggested as important are: Size (market value), Industry, and Age.  
5.2  Market value 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of AIM and OL stocks by market value (for stocks with market 
value below £800m).  We concluded from this that the main “heartland of AIM for comparisons 
purposes was in the £5m to £200m bands. We felt that stocks smaller than this would probably 
be too illiquid for any serious analysis and stocks above this were not typical of AIM. This 
heartland represents 533 of the eligible AIM stocks and 264 of the eligible OL stocks and most 
of the following analysis is based on this group. 
 
 
Figure 1:   Market Capitalisation Bands (January 2005) 
5.3  Industry groupings 
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Figure 2:   Industry Groupings AIM V OL 
While there are few stocks of this size in the Utilities and Non-cyclical Services groups there is 
otherwise a substantial representation of AIM and OL stocks in each sector.  We also examined 
a more detailed classification given by the 36 FTSE Industrial Sectors (shown in figure 3), 
however dividing the sample into so many groups leaves too few stocks in each group for useful 
analysis and, so, we use the broader groupings in the empirical analysis. 
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5.4  Age 
Finally, figure 4 shows the age profile (measured as the number of years since admission to the 
market) of stocks in the two markets.  
 
Figure 4:   Age Distribution AIM v OL 
Figure 4 shows a sharp split - 44% of current, eligible AIM stocks have joined the market in the 
last two years and almost all, 82%, in the last 5 years. This is obviously a testament to the 
marketing success of AIM, but raises three issues for comparative analysis: 
 
•  Since age and AIM membership are so strongly linked, it will be difficult to disentangle the 
relative impact of the two factors.  
 
•  Survivor bias – it could be that the relative youth of current AIM Stocks reflects the fact that 
many of the older AIM stocks have failed. If this were the case, then our focus on stocks in 
existence at a particular date might understate the true risk of the market (since failed 
stocks would not be represented).  To assess this possibility, the following table shows the 
history of stocks leaving AIM.  This shows that the number of stocks leaving AIM was 376, 
split between 138 being taken over, 93 joining the OL (mainly in the early years as the table 
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Over  Other 
Total 
Leaving 
1996  2  4  2  8 
1997  20  10  6  36 
1998  25  9  13  47 
1999  14  13  13  40 
2000  17  21  8  46 
2001  6  14  12  32 
2002  4  13  25  42 
2003  3  30  47  80 
2004  2  17  13  32 
2005  0  7  6  13 
Total  93  138  145  376 
 
This suggests that AIM stocks were as likely to be taken over as they were to fail, though the 
relative number of departures for “Other reasons” has risen since 2000. 
 
•  A comparative analysis that was mainly focussed on older AIM companies would not be 
useful from a policy viewpoint since most AIM stocks are new and most investor interest is 
in newer stocks. 
 
Figure 4 shows that AIM stocks are typically much younger than those on the OL, with the 
average age on the OL some 13 years greater than for AIM (the average age of the OL stocks 
we examine was 14.5 years, while that of AIM stocks was 2.7 years). This means that any 
straightforward analysis will be unable to distinguish the effect of age from an ‘AIM effect’. It is 
clear that there is a very strong relation between age and market membership. To control for 
this effect, we examine stocks’ relative age (i.e. the difference between the stock’s actual age 
and the average age of stocks in its market).  The following figure shows this effect (the vertical 
axis shows the number of company/months of data, and negative numbers indicate stocks 
which are below their market’s average age). 
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5.5  Liquidity 
The following graph and table show the number of company months (i.e. months in which there 
was trading for a company) for stocks in the central market value bands (i.e. with capitalisations 
between £5m and £200m) in which given numbers of trades occurred. This shows that AIM 
stocks trade somewhat less frequently than do corresponding OL stocks overall, the two 
markets have both have similar numbers of illiquid company months (49 trades per month 
corresponds to fewer than three trades per day). 
 
 
Figure 6:   Trading frequencies AIM v OL 
This shows that, within the value bands examined, no stocks traded less than daily on average, 
and that the distribution of liquidity between the markets is broadly similar.  
6  Volatility estimation 
The request from the AIM Group was for straightforward measures of volatility.  Our discussions 
with practitioners confirmed that they tended to use such straightforward measures – particularly 
the standard deviation of returns. As a result, we have generally avoided the use of complex 
measures,  but  concentrated  on  measures  which  are  generally  accepted  as  representing 
volatility. 
 
To calculate the volatility values, we based the computations on returns, not raw prices, and 
calculated monthly volatility in a number of ways. Trade prices, rather than quote prices were 
used for reasons described above.  To avoid biases caused by trade reporting at the close, we 
define a ‘representative price’ as being the price of the trade executed closest to 11:30 each 
day. Volatility is notoriously difficult to measure and is particularly troublesome in the case of 
illiquid stocks for which a regular series of trade prices may not be available.  Because of this, 
we analysed a number of measures using the basic returns data. 
6.1  Standard Deviation 
 The most popular volatility measure is simply the standard deviation of daily returns over the 
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where M indicates month, i indicates the firm, D indicates the total number of days within the 
month and d indicates the days within the month. 
6.2  Garman-Klass 
This measure was proposed to measure volatility when the data is not rich or frequent enough 
to allow use of the standard deviation.  The measure requires only four values per month: the 
opening, closing, high and low prices for the period (all measured in logarithms).  The measure 
is then 
2 2 2
it it it 1 it it it it GK (O C ) 0.5(H L ) 0.3862(C O ) − = − + − − −  
6.3  Squared Returns 
This measure is used only when almost no data exists, either because the data is incomplete or 
is highly aggregated, or the asset trades so infrequently that it is not possible even to compute 











=    
   
 
where PiM is the price of share i in month M. 
6.4  Trading frequency 
The final measures of risk are those based not on price but on trading activity.  These measures 
may capture a different aspect of risk – that relating to liquidity, market depth and the possibility 
of immediacy.  We considered: the number of trades, the number of shares traded and the 
money value of such trading. 
6.5  Period 
The period for which volatility is calculated matters. For example it is important to calculate 
monthly volatilities if the objective is monthly rebalancing of a portfolio.  We focus on monthly 
figures because this is the period most often used in the industry, and because illiquid stocks 
may not trade often enough to support more frequent estimates. 
6.6  Portfolios 
It is important to note that the basic rule of risk is that the risk of a portfolio is almost always less 
than the average of the risks of the constituent stocks.  This insight forms the basis of modern 
portfolio theory and explains why “diversification pays”.  This research was specified to examine 
the volatility of individual stocks and therefore does not examine portfolio effects (although these 
are briefly shown below). 
7  Basic analysis of relative volatility 
In order to present a convenient summary of the results, we show the ratio of the volatility on 
AIM to that of the OL.  To do this, we followed the approach below: 
1.  Calculate the monthly volatility for each stock for each month ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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2.  Calculate the average volatility in each month for each market by averaging the volatilities 
for all stocks in the given market 
3.  Calculate  for  each  month  the  relative  volatility  as  the  AIM  value  divided  by  the 
corresponding OL value 
4.  Finally, average the relative volatility figure over time. 
 
Thus, relative risk measures above unity suggest that AIM is more volatile than the OL.  It 
should be noted that this is not the only approach that could be used and that the statistical 
behaviour of the mean of the ratio of average standard deviations is not well defined – hence we 
do not attempt to assess the statistical significance of the results in this section. 
  
Figure 7 shows the results for the volume measures described above. 
 
Figure 7:   Relative trading on AIM v OL 
The results demonstrate that for two measures of volume – value of trading and bargains – the 
OL stocks in the sample traded significantly more frequently than the AIM stocks. For shares 
traded AIM volumes were below those of OL stocks but have increased in the last two years and 
in 2004 exceeded shares traded OL stocks. 
 
Using the same ratio approach we compared the relative volatility of returns, and figure 8 shows 
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Figure 8:   Relative volatilities of AIM and OL stocks 
In all years this shows AIM stocks to be substantially more volatile than comparable (in terms of 
size) OL stocks. The level of volatility of AIM stocks ranged from 2 to 3 times that of comparable 
OL stocks in every year and was particularly marked for one measure in 2003. Overall, volatility 
of AIM is much greater, by a factor of two or three. 
 
We conclude that a simple comparison of volatilities is consistent with the perception that AIM 
stocks are riskier than corresponding OL stocks.  In the next section, we consider whether this 
difference may be attributed to factors other than simply the market on which the stock has 
chosen to list. 
8  Relative risk adjusting for size, age and liquidity 
In this section, we consider the impact of other variables that are associated with AIM stocks. 
One of the striking features of the data is the unequal distribution of stocks reported in earlier 
sections in regard to: 
 
•  Size – OL stocks are generally much larger than those on AIM 
•  Industry – there were some differences between the industry profiles of the markets 
•  Age – OL stocks are much older than AIM stocks.   
•  Liquidity – AIM stocks are often relatively illiquid 
 
The interviews with practitioners suggested that these factors might all contribute significantly to 
stocks’ risk.  However, the significant differences between the distribution of age and sizes for 
AIM and OL stocks means that the simple analysis presented below should be seen as 
indicative, rather than definitive. 
8.1  Size 
Figure 9 shows the relative volatility (measured as the ratio of the standard deviations of the two 
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Figure 9:   Relative volatility by market capitalisation 
The results show that there are differences between the volatility which are related to size.  
However, they also show that, in all size bands, AIM volatility is greater than OL volatility. 
8.2  Industry 
Figure 10 shows the analysis of the relative volatility (measured by the standard deviation) for 
the different industry groups. 
 
Figure 10:   Relative volatility by Industry 
Overall, these results show AIM as having roughly double the volatility of the comparable OL 
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volatility than do the other sectors.  It may be that a greater investigation of this section would 
shed further light on the question of the differing risks between the markets. Figure 2 shows that 
there are very few AIM and OL stocks in this sector, and so this outlier is probably due to small 
sample bias. 
8.3  Age 
Figure 11 shows an analysis of relative volatility by age. The results suggest that relative 
volatility declines with age. This is consistent with the views expressed in the interview program 
– that age was a risk factor for about two to three years. However the different age distributions 
of AIM and OL stocks means there are relatively few AIM stocks in the older groups and 
relatively few OL stocks in the younger groups. 
 
Figure 11:   Relative volatility by firm age 
8.4  Liquidity and market volatility 
One factor not considered so far is market volatility.  Figure 12 shows the risk (measured by the 
monthly standard deviation of returns) of four groupings of number of trades-per-month for the 
two markets (AIM and the DOL), as well as the risk of the FTSE 100 index for the same period.  
The vertical axis shows percentage standard deviation per month.   
 
This demonstrates that, whatever the differences in risk between AIM and DOL, they are minor 
compared to the differences between them and the FTSE 100.   Comparing the related groups, 
the  highest  volatility  AIM  stocks  are  in the  lowest  liquidity  category,  where  (as  the  table 
quantifies) AIM is almost twice as volatile as the corresponding OL group.  However, the most 
important implication of the graph, and table, is to show how relatively small are the differences 
between AIM and its peer-group OL stocks when compared to the difference in volatility 
between either of the groups of small stocks and the market for the largest listed stocks (i.e. 
those in the FTSE 100).  Of course this comparison greatly overstates the true differences in 
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Figure 12:   Volatility by trading frequency 
9  Portfolio effects 
As noted above, this research is specified in terms of individual stock’s volatilities.  It therefore 
examines total risk, rather than the systematic (or beta, or market) risks of portfolios of such 
stocks.  To highlight the size of the risk reductions in portfolios, the following graph shows the 
risks of all stocks on each market as the average of individual risks and also as the risk of an 
equally  weighted  portfolio  of  those  stocks.   The  FTSE  100,  itself  a  portfolio  albeit  value 
weighted, is shown for comparison. 
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As can be seen the systematic risk of each market is of the order of one-third the total risk. 
10 Regression analyses with multiple variables 
This analysis attempts to explain the volatility of stocks by constructing a model in which 
volatility is a function of a number of other variables – such as size, industry and age. One of the 
variables represents whether a stock is on AIM or the OL. If this variable shows a significant 
causal effect on volatility then we would conclude that volatility was linked to the market on 
which a stock is traded.  
10.1 Regression model 
Our literature review identified twelve possible reasons why AIM stocks might be expected to be 
riskier than those on the OL.  These reasons can be grouped into those that relate to the firms 
that list on AIM, and those that relate to the market structure on AIM.  For some of these effects, 
we have sufficient data to analyse the variable directly.  Others are less tangible, and have no 
satisfactory  measure.    Others  are  simply  part  of  the  ‘AIM  Effect’.    The  following  table 
summarises these effects.  
  
Effect Type  Detail  Measure 
Size - Firms on AIM tend to be smaller than 
firms on the OL  Size bands 
Age – AIM firms tend to be younger than OL 
firms  
Age  relative  to  market 
norm 
Industrial Sector – AIM firms tend to be in 
riskier industrial sectors  1-digit FTSE classification 
Firm Related 
Liquidity – AIM firms tend to be less liquid 
than  OL  firms,  which  may  bias  volatility 
upwards 
Number of trades  
Regulation – AIM has less demanding entry 
requirements and regulations than the OL 
Information – Fewer analysts follow AIM firms 
and less disclosure is required 
Market Related 
Market Structure – AIM’s trading mechanism 
may induce volatility (e.g. bid-ask bounce) 
The ‘AIM Effect’ 
Free float – AIM firms may have a smaller 
free float than OL firms 
Lock-in – AIM firms may experience volatility 
around the expiration date 
Venture Capital – AIM firms may be volatile 
when VCs close their investment 
Skewness – Differences in the distribution of 
return may induce volatility 
Other 
Gearing  –  AIM  firms  may  be  more  highly 
geared than OL firms. 
No data available 
 
In addition, we also constructed dummy variables (which take the value ‘1’ if the event is true 
and zero otherwise. For example “Year1” is equal to 1 in 2001 and zero in 2000, and 2002-
2004) to provide additional control: 
•  The stock – allowing for stock specific effects 
•  The Year – allowing for annual effects 
•  Market Volatility – the volatility of the FTSE 100 index in the given period 
•  Exit – if the stock is within six months of a takeover or other market exit 
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    Number  of 
Dummy 
Variables 
Stock  One per stock  856 
Year  To control for different periods - one per year  5 
Industry  1-digit groups  10 
MV Band  4 groups   4 
Age  Stock age relative to industry average  5 
FTSE  Market volatility - standard deviation  n/a 
Near Exit  Within 6 months of stock death?  1 
Switch  Does stock switch markets  1 
AIM  If on AIM  1 
 
The regression is based on some 32,800 company months and the stocks in market value 
bands 3-6 (£5m-£200m as explained above).  
10.2 Regression results 
The following table shows the results.  Only coefficients that were statistically significant are 
shown (those significant at 10% are shown in italic, all others are significant at 1% significance). 
 










Intercept  0.04557  0.01614    0.78106 
Trades  0.00001  0.00003  0.00011  0.01008 
Value 4  -0.01223  -0.00836     
Value 5  -0.01884  -0.01098  -0.01915  0.36457 
Value 6  -0.02286  -0.01571  -0.02630  0.92458 
Industry 6        -0.77235 
Industry 8    -0.00903     
Industry 9    0.00956     
Age 1        0.29778 
Age 2    0.00679     
FTSE Risk  0.72620  1.03738  0.63443  -1.69548 
2001  -0.00616  -0.00643    -0.97394 
2002        -1.39755 
2003    -0.00571  0.02555  -1.57619 
2004  -0.01652  -0.01793  -0.01764  -1.60013 
Pure AIM  0.01614  0.00879  0.02067   
R-squared  0.07535  0.11735  0.03702  0.55204 
 
The columns headed “coefficient” show the size of the effect.  Here, a coefficient of, say 0.01 
means that volatility is 1% higher in the presence of this effect than it would be without.  Thus, 
for example, stocks in MV band 4 are, on average 1.223% LESS risky than the corresponding 
stocks in band 3 when measuring volatility by the standard deviation. 
 
Key results include: 
•  The number of trades per month is significant for the standard deviation risk measure, 
indicating that volatility increases with trading volume. 
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•  The market value indicators are negative and increasing in size for higher value bands.  
This means that volatility decreases, the larger is the company’s capitalization. 
 
•  Industry groups have a very modest effect on volatility.  Only groups 6, 8 and 9 (Cyclical 
Services, Utilities and Financials) have any effect on average volatility.  Of note is that 
group 0, resources, has no effect on volatility. 
 
•  Company age is only modestly important with minor, but insignificant increases in volatility 
associated with very young companies. 
 
•  Contemporaneous market risk, measured by that of the FTSE 100, has a weakly positive 
effect. When the stock market is volatile, both AIM and the OL stocks tend to be more 
volatile. 
 
•  The year has an effect, with lesser volatilities associated with the later years. 
 
•  The individual company effects have been omitted from the table, but reveal nothing. 
 
•  There are no effects for companies which switch markets. 
 
•  Companies within 6 months of death do not exhibit unusual volatility. 
 
•  The explanatory power of the model is very low – but this is not unusual for panel datasets 
such as this.  
 
•  Finally, the variable ‘AIM’, which indicates whether a given stock is listed on AIM shows that 
volatility is somewhat greater for AIM stocks.  However the effect is not numerically large. 
Being on AIM increases volatility by 1% to 2%. 
11 Switching stocks 
This section refines the analysis further by considering stocks which switched from one market 
to the other.  The benefit of this is that many of the control variables are unnecessary, as we are 
comparing one company to itself.   
 
Thus, we examine the volatility of companies switching from AIM to the OL, and from the OL to 
AIM  during  the  sample  period.  This  analysis  allows  us  to  control  for  company  specific 
characteristics when comparing volatility on different markets.   
 
We select all companies that switched markets during the sample period.  We then exclude 
those that both switched exchange and changed their ISIN (because the ISIN change may be 
associated with structural changes). We also excluded the small number of companies that 
switched more than once. This results in a sample of 160 ‘switchers’: 130 companies switched 
from the OL to AIM, and 30 companies switched from AIM to the OL. 
 
  All Sample in Jan 05  Switchers 
  N.  Average Mkt Cap  
 
N.  Average Mkt Cap 
Switch Time 
AIM  760  £29.33m  30  £193.28m 
OL  629  £183.52m  130  £17.25m 
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Clearly companies that switch from AIM to the OL have greater market capitalisation than the 
average  AIM  stock,  and  companies  that  switch  from  the  OL  to  AIM  have  lower  market 
capitalisation than the average OL stock. 
 
Figure 14:   Capitalisation of switching stocks 
11.1 Relative volatility analysis 
In this ratio analysis of the “switchers”, we used the following procedure 
1.  for each stock which switched between markets once (either AIM-OL or OL-AIM), we 
defined the ‘switch’ period as the three month period centred on the switch date (e.g. one 
month before the switch, the switch month and the month following). 
2.  We then considered the two six month periods surrounding the switch period and defined 
these as the ‘pre-switch’ and post-switch’ periods. 
3.  For each switching stock we calculated the average monthly volatility during the pre and 
post-switch periods. 
4.  We then calculated the relative volatility for each switching stock – defined as the average 
volatility in the post-switch period divided by the average volatility for that stock during its 
pre-switch period.  Thus, a decline in volatility following a switch from one market to another 
would be revealed as a relative volatility of less than one.  Note that this measure is 
independent of the absolute volatility of the stock – we are focussing only on changes in 
volatility. 
5.  We then averaged the relative volatilities across stocks both in total and based on the year 
of the switch (e.g. for all stocks which switched market in 2001). 
 
The following diagram summarises the results 
































OL to AIM AIM to OLICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
Copyright 2006 Board, Dufour, Sutcliffe and Wells    23
     
 
Figure 15:   Relative post to pre switch volatilities 
This shows that on average stocks switching to AIM from the OL experienced a 10% increase in 
volatility, while those switching from AIM to the OL experienced a 1% increase.  Equally, the 
later years show a much more varied set of results, with switchers to AIM in 2003 experiencing 
a decrease in volatility. In three of the five years analysed, switchers to the OL experienced 
larger rises in volatility than did switchers to AIM. 
 
It should however be noted that, although there were 130 switchers to AIM, there were only 30 
switchers to the OL. So on average, each “ToOL” column in the figure represents only 6 stocks, 
and the results will be heavily influenced by the behaviour of individual stocks. 
11.2 Switchers’ risk relative to the market  
We defined the event day as the day of the market switch, and conducted an exploratory 
analysis by creating a grey period of 5 trading days (a week) around the event day. Data for 
these two weeks was discarded. Then we formed a sample window of 63 trading days (3 
months) around the grey period. We used this period to compute pre- and post-event volatilities.  
We selected a 3-month trading window around the event because this maximises the number of 
market switches that we can study. 
 
Because we compared the volatility for the same company during different time periods, we 
wanted to control for overall market volatility. In order to do this we used the ratio of stock 
specific volatility to market volatility, where the volatility of the FTSE100 index was used to 
approximate market volatility.  
 
We define  
•  AIM to Market Risk = AIM Volatility/ FTSE 100 Volatility 
•  OL to Market Risk = OL Volatility/FTSE 100 Volatility 
 
Having controlled for market risk in this way, we then computed the relative risk measure used 
in the previous part of the analysis (measuring volatility in 3 different ways), and counted the 
number of companies for which the relative risk (AIM to OL) was greater than 1 (see figure 
below).  Thus, the diagram shows the proportion of stocks for which the relative risk measure 
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Figure 16:   Switchers risks between markets 
This shows that when companies trade on AIM they tend to have   
•  a lower number of trades per day, 
•  marginally higher Garman-Klass volatility, 
•  a higher standard deviation of daily returns. 
12 GARCH analysis of switching stocks 
In order to confirm the results of the preliminary analysis with a more formal econometric model 
for volatility, we estimated GARCH models using daily returns and assessed the AIM effect. 
Namely,  we  measured  whether  the  volatility  for  stocks  that  switch  market  is  statistically 
significantly larger when the stock trades on AIM than when the stock trades on the OL. 
12.1 Introduction to GARCH 
Total individual stock return volatility can be decomposed into a market-wide risk component 
and a company specific risk component. Following traditional asset pricing theory and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), academics and market participants have mostly focused 
on  the  market  risk  component  (beta  risk)  of  a  stock’s  volatility.  However,  recent  studies 
(Campell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu, 2001) argue that the company specific component has been 
the main driver of volatility variations in recent years. Furthermore, company specific volatility is 
important when studying the effects of particular events such as market switching. “Events affect 
individual stocks, and the statistical significance of abnormal event-related returns is determined 
by the volatility of individual stock returns relative to the market or industry” (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay, 1997). 
  
The analysis involved constructing a series of daily log-returns, Reti,t for each sample stock 
using the price of the last trade of the day. We checked for the robustness of our results by also 
using reference prices sampled at 11:30am. As a proxy for the market returns we used the 
FTSE 100 index, and constructed another series of daily log-returns, FTSE Ret. 
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it 0 1 FTSE,t it Ret Ret =β +β +ε  
where we assume that the disturbance is normally distributed with variance σit
2. In addition, we 
assume that the conditional variance of the disturbances
2
it σ  is modelled as a linear function of 
lagged squared disturbances
2
i,t 1 − ε  and lagged conditional variances
2
i,t 1 − σ : 
 
2 2 2
i,t 0 1 i,t 1 2 i,t 1 3 i,t I − − σ = α +α ε +α σ +α  
 
where Iit is a dummy variable which is equal to one when company i trades on AIM, and zero 
otherwise. The specification above allows us to test whether there is a significant shift in the 
level of the volatility of company i when it trades on AIM. 
12.2 GARCH results 
The changing pattern of volatility for the whole market is shown in figure 17, which shows that 
the volatility of the market decreased significantly in the last part of the sample period. 
 
 
Figure 17:   GARCH results for returns on the FTSE index 
 
The results from the GARCH model estimation show that only 37 of the switching companies 
had a significant increase in volatility when trading on AIM, while 65 companies had a significant 
decrease in volatility when trading on AIM. 
 
Two examples are shown in figure 18 below. The first shows a company for which returns on 
the OL are more volatile than the returns on AIM, and the second is a company for which 
returns on AIM are significantly more volatile that the returns on the OL (always controlling for 
market volatility). The vertical line indicates the time when the company transfers from one to 
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Figure 18:   Representative GARCH volatility changes over switch period 
13 Including Riskless Trades 
In order to check this result, we increased the sample by including all trades with trade indicator 
“RT” (riskless trades). Because some of the riskless trades are published several days after the 
trades are executed, we ranked trades using the publication time stamp rather than the trade 
time stamp. Therefore, we measure volatility of the market as perceived by a public trader that 
simply observes trades as they are published. Most of the RT trades are performed on AIM.  
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Figure 19 shows that if we include riskless trades in the sample the new results indicate that 
there is a greater likelihood that companies trading on AIM have a greater number of trades per 
day, a lower Garman-Klass volatility (computed only over days with at least 1 trade), and a 
marginally higher standard deviation of daily returns. 
 
With this new sample, the results change considerably in that the difference in volatilities 
between markets now vanishes. This result may reveal the importance of market makers in 
reducing volatility on AIM. 
 
Finally, when we decompose the analysis by type of switch, we obtain the following results: 
      Number of firms  Percentage of firms 
  Firms  Average 
Daily Trades  GK Vol  St Dev  GK Vol  St Dev 
OL to AIM  130  62  57  69  44%  53% 
AIM to OL  30  23  18  13  60%  43% 
Total  160  85  75  82  47%  49% 
 
In the table, the final three columns show the proportion of companies in the sub-sample with a 
ratio greater than 1, namely with a higher ratio for AIM trading. 
 
This more detailed analysis shows that, in each sub-sample, companies are more likely to have 
a greater number of trades and a higher Garman-Klass volatility when trading on the originating 
exchange, and a higher standard deviation of returns on the destination exchange. This can be 
interpreted as suggesting that the structure of the market may not, after all, consistently affect 
the volatility. 
14 Extended GARCH analysis 
We use the new sample, which includes RT trades, to re-estimate the GARCH model. The 
results from the GARCH model estimation show that only 30 (19%) of the sample companies 
have significantly greater volatility when trading on AIM, while 67 companies (42%) have 
significantly lower volatility when on AIM.  
 
    Number of firms  Percentage of firms 








OL to AIM  130  23  58  18%  45% 
AIM to OL  30  7  9  23%  30% 
Total  160  30  67  19%  42% 
 
Finally, we re-estimated the GARCH models using robust standard errors to correct for possible 
autocorrelation in the residuals. The estimation results show that only 2 (1.3%) companies have 
a significant increase in volatility when trading on AIM, while 15 (9.9%) companies have a 
significant decrease in volatility when trading on AIM. 
 
    Number of firms  Percentage of firms 








OL to AIM  130  2  13  2%  10% 
AIM to OL  30  0  2  0%  7% 
Total  160  2  15  1%  9% 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the differences in volatility which appeared to be present in the 
simple analyses markedly decrease when we use more sophisticated estimation procedures.I ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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15 Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to examine the truth behind the perception that the AIM 
market was systematically and consistently more risky than the OL market in comparable 
stocks. The research was conducted by the ICMA Centre at the University of Reading to a 
commission from the AIM Group of the London Stock Exchange. The main finding of the 
research is that while at a superficial level AIM stocks may seem more risky than comparable 
OL stocks, as the analysis is refined to ensure that the comparisons focus purely on the effect of 
being on different markets the difference shrinks and finally disappears. The final conclusion of 
the research is that the empirical analysis concurs with the current market practitioner view that 
there is no significant risk differential. 
 
AIM has been a considerable success. Even by its survival over 10 years it has succeeded in 
relation to similar markets in other countries. But during that period it has seen rapid growth and 
during the last 5 years has emerged as the market of choice for smaller, newer companies in 
the UK and increasingly beyond the UK. This dominance of AIM has meant that in recent years 
the vast majority of newer companies coming to the UK market have joined AIM.  
 
The research comprised three elements – an interview program, a literature review and an 
extensive empirical analysis. The interview program suggested three conclusions: 
•  While AIM has less demanding requirements than the OL (for example in terms of free 
float) the Nominated Advisors almost always insist that companies coming to AIM adopt 
standards that are higher than the minimum required and, in practice, are similar to those of 
the OL. 
•  While AIM, in its earlier days may have been more risky, its growth in recent years and the 
diversity of companies attracted to the market mean that risk is now much lower and, in the 
view of the interviewees, AIM companies are not significantly different in risk terms from 
comparable companies on the OL. 
•  Age (time since admission) of company is an important factor in determining risk, but after a 
relatively short time, perhaps 2 to 3 years, its importance disappears. 
•  In the AIM market there is segmentation between the larger investable companies and a 
non-investable group – typically very small companies. The non-investable portion is high-
risk by its nature and because it is very difficult to trade. The same is also true of the OL. 
 
The literature review showed, among other things, the surprising lack of research into smaller 
cap markets in general, and AIM in particular. The researchers only found about 50 research 
papers relating to these markets and most of these related to the ill-fated Neuer Markt and/or to 
IPO pricing. The main relevant results from the review were that: 
•  Movements between markets have not been associated with significant changes in risk 
•  There are a number of risk-related characteristics of companies – in particular, size, age 
and industry – that tend to be related to market. AIM, for example, tends to have relatively 
younger stocks. 
•  The analysis was considerably complicated by the success of the AIM market in attracting 
new companies in recent years. As a consequence, AIM companies are almost all much 
younger than comparable OL companies. Since age was identified in the interviews as a 
major risk factor, the fact that AIM companies were generally younger meant that the 
analysis would have to try and distinguish the effect of market (AIM or OL) from that of age 
of company.  Therefore we were obliged to adopt a series of progressively more complex 
techniques and various measures of volatility for the empirical analysis. The study used 5 
years of high frequency trading data to conduct the analyses described below. 
 
Whole market analyses applying progressively more complex techniques to the stocks identified 
as comparable and which had not changed markets during the five-year period of the study. 
•  A simple ratio analysis – comparing the volatility (as calculated from trade data) of AIM 
Stocks with OL stocks in each year. In all years this showed AIM Stocks to be substantially ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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more volatile than comparable (in terms of size) OL stocks. The level of volatility of AIM 
stocks ranged from 2 to 3 times that of comparable OL stocks in every year. 
•  Normalising for the age difference in an attempt to offset the age effect. The results 
suggested that larger stocks were considerably more volatile than smaller stocks and also 
that AIM stocks were significantly more volatile than similar sized OL stocks. 
•  Multi-variate regression analysis – using the main risk-related variables (size, industry, age 
and market) identified in the literature review to explain differences in volatility.  These 
results suggest that AIM Stocks were significantly more volatile, though the difference was 
far smaller than that given by the simple ratio analysis. However the strong correlation 
between age and market makes it difficult for a regression to distinguish the impact of the 
two variables.  
 
A significant number of stocks have moved between the two markets – more recently the 
direction has been almost exclusively from OL to AIM. Such companies offer an opportunity to 
study the single event, a market switch, and abstract from other company-specific factors. 
Again, a succession of progressively more complex analyses was applied   A simple analysis of 
switchers’ volatility using ratios of pre and post-switch volatility to assess the impact of the 
switch with the following results: 
o  OL to AIM switchers, 55% of these has greater volatility on AIM. 
o  AIM to the OL, 45% of these has greater volatility on AIM.  
o  Overall switching stocks showed 10% higher volatility on AIM 
These results are consistent with the notion that AIM is viewed as slightly more risky. However 
they are at odds with some previous studies of the US market, identified in the literature review 
that showed that a switch from the NASDAQ market to either NYSE or AMEX had no effect on 
volatility. 
 
We then used high-frequency data to construct GARCH models to study the dynamics of 
volatility over time. GARCH models were estimated separately for each stock that switched 
market. The results show that it is hard to come to concrete conclusions about the change in 
volatility of switchers since it varies considerably from company to company. This is entirely to 
be expected, reflecting the specific circumstances of individual companies, but it makes it hard 
to draw overall conclusions. Only 11% of the switchers show a significant change in volatility 
after the switch. However, the prevalent change seems to be a reduction in volatility when 
trading on AIM rather than the opposite. We therefore conclude from this that for the switchers 
the move to AIM was accompanied, most usually by a decline in volatility. 
 
Finally, we extended the complex switchers analysis we made two changes: 
•  Including risk-free principal trades (crosses done through market makers). These had been 
excluded as likely to distort the results, but on further inspection we found that these were a 
significant element of total business and proportionately more important for AIM stocks 
(since AIM stocks tend to be smaller and less liquid). The effect of including risk-free 
principal trades is to smooth the price history of stocks. This is consistent with the use of 
risk-free principal trades to reduce price impact caused by illiquidity. The results were: 
o  19% of switchers had higher volatility in the AIM period 
o  42% had lower volatility in the AIM period 
•  Applying more robust significance tests – i.e. being more demanding in deciding whether 
statistically small difference represented real differences. The results were: 
o  Only 1% of switchers showed increased volatility in the AIM period 
o  Almost 10% showed lower volatility in the AIM period 
 
Our overall conclusion is that the analysis of switchers shows that the differences in volatility 
when stocks switch between AIM and the OL are very small, usually not significant statistically 
and tend, if anything, to indicate a slightly lower volatility when on AIM. 
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It is worth speculating briefly as to why AIM might not be more risky than the OL. By and large 
those  we  have  spoken  to  and  the  literature  we  have  reviewed  have  suggested  that  the 
regulatory differences, while important in attracting companies to AIM, may not have a large 
effect on investors because: 
•  initial and on-going disclosure requirements are similar 
•  nominated advisors are strict in ensuring companies comply with higher standards than the 
basic requirements 
•  the lower free-float requirements for AIM are rarely an issue as, we understand, most 
advisors would insist on an AIM issue having similar free float to the OL requirement. 
•  the lower requirements for consulting shareholders on corporate actions are rarely a 
problem – though in special cases one can see this might not be true. 
•  the shorter track record requirement, which could be an important risk factor, is less 
important than one might expect – largely because the minimum requirements for AIM and 
the OL both lie within the “young company” time horizon of 2 to 3 years. 
 
 
The main conclusion that comes out of this analysis is that the initial conception that AIM has 
higher volatility than the OL is perfectly understandable. Our simpler analyses generally found a 
large difference between volatility of AIM and OL stocks. However as we moved to more 
complex  analyses  the  difference  dwindled  or  vanished.  The  schematic  diagram  below 




It is clear that more sophisticated - and therefore we believe more accurate – analyses have 
been associated with smaller or zero differences between the markets. It is revealing that the 
opinion of market practitioners and the conclusions of the most sophisticated analyses concur – 
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  Appendix A – Literature review of empirical studies of 
small cap markets 
   
A1 Introduction 
A search was conducted for empirical studies of small capitalization exchanges, including those 
in the UK. The majority of small capitalization exchanges are located in Europe, and the 
exchanges (some of which have subsequently closed) for which empirical evidence is available 
are set out in table A1. 
 
Market  Country  Start Date 
Nouveau Marché  France   14 February 1996 
Neuer Markt  Germany  10 March 1997 
NMAX  Netherlands  25 March 1997 
Euro.NM Brussels  Belgium  11 April 1997 
Nuovo Mercato  Italy  17 June 1999 
Unlisted Securities Market (USM)  UK  1980 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM)  UK  19 June 1995 
EASDAQ (subsequently NASDAQ Europe)  Europe  June 1996 
TechMARK  UK  4 November 1999 
AMEX Emerging Company Marketplace  USA  18 March 1992 
JASDAQ  Japan  June 1976 
KOSDAQ  South Korea  1 July 1996 
SESDAQ  Singapore  February 1987 
TAISDAQ  Taiwan  22 May 1998 
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM)  Hong Kong  25 November 1999 
 
Table A1: Small Capitalization Exchanges for which there is an Empirical Study 
 
The date each exchange commenced is shown in the list above. The first five exchanges in the 
above list constitute Euro.NM. In addition to the exchanges listed in table 1, there are, or have 
been, small capitalization exchanges in Spain, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Austria; but 
no empirical studies were found relating to any of these exchanges. Outside Europe, small 
capitalization exchanges have been created in Malaysia, Australia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea and Canada. There are (or have been) small capitalization exchanges in other countries, 
but they tend to be created and closed with considerable frequency. For example, in February 
2001 the Nairobi Stock Exchange established the Alternative Investment Market for small 
companies with high growth potential. The US does not currently have a dedicated small 
capitalization market (the AMEX Emerging Company Marketplace closed on 11
th May 1995), 
and many small US companies are listed on NASDAQ, along with some very large companies.  
Many studies have compared the NASDAQ and NYSE markets, but because they do not focus 
on small NASDAQ stocks, they are not relevant to this research, and so are not included here. 
 
Section 2 of this review summarizes the empirical studies of initial public offerings (IPOs) on 
small capitalization exchanges. Section 3 considers the available evidence on the volatility of 
small capitalization exchanges. Section 4 mentions the empirical studies of other aspects of 
small cap exchanges. Finally section 5 has the conclusions. 
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A2 Initial public offerings 
A prime function for a small capitalization exchange is the floatation of small companies. This, 
coupled with the relatively short lives of the main small capitalization exchanges, means that the 
empirical literature on small capitalization exchanges is dominated by studies of initial public 
offerings (IPOs). These studies have addressed topics such as the size and determinants of the 
underpricing of IPOs, and the extent to which the initial underpricing is removed over time, the 
role of venture capitalists in the IPO, the change in the gearing of companies undergoing an 
IPO, etc. Table A2 lists (in chronological order) academic studies of various features of IPOs on 
small capitalization exchanges.  
 
Study Authors  Small Cap Market Studied 
Young & Zaima (1986)  US OTC 
Buckland & Davis (1989)  Unlisted Securities Market 
Levis (1993)  Unlisted Securities Market 
Holland and Horton (1993)  Unlisted Securities Market 
Rees (1997)  Unlisted Securities Market 
Kutsuna, Cowling & Westhead (2000)  JASDAQ 
Fischer (2000)  Neuer Markt 
Arosio, Giudici & Paleari (2000)  EASDAQ,  Nouveau  Marché,  Neuer  Markt, 
NMAX, Euro.NM Brussels & Nuovo Mercato 
Torstila (2001)  EASDAQ & Neuer Markt 
Arosio, Bertoni & Giudici (2001)  Nuovo Mercato 
Kiss & Stehle (2002)   Neuer Markt 
Kraus (2002)   Neuer Markt 
Aussenegg, Pichler & Stomper (2002)  Neuer Markt 
Hunger,(2003)  Neuer Markt 
Franzke & Schlag (2003)   Neuer Markt 
Manigart & De Maeseneire (2003)  EASDAQ,  Nouveau  Marché,  Neuer  Markt, 
NMAX, Euro.NM Brussels & Nuovo Mercato 
Goergen, Khurshed, McCahery & 
Renneboog (2004) 
Nouveau Marché, Neuer Markt, NMAX, 
Euro.NM Brussels & Nuovo Mercato 
Rindermann (2004)  Nouveau Marché, Neuer Markt & techMARK 
Goergen, Khurshed & Renneboog (2004)  Nouveau Marché & Neuer Markt  
Franzke (2004)  Neuer Markt  
Giudici & Roosenboom (2004a) 
NASDAQ  Europe,  Nouveau  Marché,  Neuer 
Markt,  NMAX,  Euro.NM  Brussels  &  Nuovo 
Mercato 
Giudici & Roosenboom (2004b) 
NASDAQ  Europe,  Nouveau  Marché,  Neuer 
Markt,  NMAX,  Euro.NM  Brussels  &  Nuovo 
Mercato 
 
  Table A2: Studies of IPOs on Small Capitalization Markets 
 
Some  studies  of  IPOs  on  small  capitalization  exchanges  have  focused  on  the  lock-in 
agreement, and what happens to prices when it expires, and these are listed in table A3. Under 
a lock-in agreement, insiders agree not to sell their shares for a specified period of time after the 
IPO, or until the occurrence of some specified company event. 
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Study Authors  Small Cap Market Studied 
Espenlaub, Goergen & Khurshed (2001)  techMARK 
Kraus & Burghof (2003)  Neuer Markt  
Goergen, Renneboog & Khurshed (2004)  Nouveau Marché & Neuer Markt  
Nowak (2004)  Neuer Markt  
Bessler & Kurth (2004)   Neuer Markt  
Espenlaub, Goergen, Khurshed & 
Renneboog (2004)  techMARK 
 
  Table A3: Studies on IPO Lock-ups on Small Capitalization Markets 
 
Tables A2 and A3 reveal that the Neuer Markt has been extensively researched, while the other 
members of Euro.NM have also been widely studied. There have also been a few studies of the 
USM, techMARK, JASDAQ and EASDAQ. What is quite remarkable is the total absence of any 
empirical studies of IPOs on AIM. 
 
A few studies have looked at how the companies were valued for the IPO, and these are listed 
in table A4. In this case there is one study (Botman, Roosenboom and Van Der Goot, 2004) 
which includes AIM. 
 
Study Authors  Small Cap Market Studied 
Botman, Roosenboom & Van Der Goot 
(2004)  
EASDAQ,  Nouveau  Marché,  Neuer  Markt, 
NMAX, Euro.NM Brussels, Nuovo Mercato, AIM 
& NASDAQ 
Cassia, Paleari & Vismara (2004)  Nuovo Mercato 
Trautwein & Vorstius (2004)  Neuer Markt 
 
  Table A4: Studies on IPO Values on Small Capitalization Markets 
 
A3 Risk 
There are a number of reasons why companies listed on AIM may be riskier than firms on the 
OL: 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to be smaller than firms on the OL. It is well known that small 
capitalization firms have higher total risk than similar large capitalization firms. Small 
companies are less diversified than large companies, and may in extreme cases effectively 
be a bet on whether there is oil or gas at the bottom of a hole in the ground. Eckert (2002) 
found that German firms which choose to list on the Neuer Markt, rather than the 1st Market 
Segment, are riskier, smaller and younger. 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to be younger than firms on the OL. Young firms tend to be riskier 
than well established firms because their business model may be unproven, and the staff 
less experienced. 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to be in industrial sectors, like mining and oil and gas, which are 
inherently risky. 
•  AIM has weaker regulations and surveillance than the OL. For example, there is no 
requirement for a minimum proportion of the shares to be in public hands, no trading record 
requirement, no requirement for shareholder approval of transactions, and no minimum 
market capitalization. This permits the listing of inherently riskier companies, run by people 
who may have criminal convictions and are more willing to take risks. 
•  Firms traded on AIM tend to be less liquid than those on the OL with less frequent trading, 
and this results in fewer, larger price movements. If risk is quantified using a measure like ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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the standard deviation that squares deviations, this will result in higher measured risk. The 
presence of liquidity providers can reduce price volatility by smoothing out demand and 
supply for uninformed traders.  
•  The  steady  flow  of  information  to  the  market  may  be  less  well  developed  for  small 
capitalization companies. Small companies may make fewer announcements, leading to 
fewer, but larger, information disclosures. They may also be followed by fewer analysts, 
who discover and publicize relevant information on the firm. If risk is quantified using a 
measure such as the standard deviation of returns, this lumpiness of the information flow 
will also increase risk. 
•  Firms listed on AIM tend to have a smaller free float than firms on the OL. Since the ratio of 
tradable shares to total shares is lower for firms listed on AIM, the price impact of news 
tends to be larger for AIM companies, leading to higher measured risk. 
•  Firms listed on AIM are subject to the expiration of the lock-up period, which can lead to 
return volatility around the expiration date. 
•  Firms listed on AIM may be more highly geared than firms on the OL. In which case, even if 
the income streams of two companies are equally risky, the share price of the more highly 
geared company will be more volatile. Hutchinson, Meric and Meric (1988) compared firms 
that floated on the USM with those of a similar size and industrial group that did not. Prior to 
joining the USM, the quoted firms were more highly geared, growing faster and had less 
liquid assets. Bottazzi & Rin (2002) present a large amount of information on companies 
which listed on the Nouveau Marché, Neuer Markt and Nuovo Mercato. The gearing 
(Debt/(Debt + Equity)) of firms that were about to list on the Nouveau Marché was 77%, 
while for the Neuer Markt it was 75%. After the IPO, gearing dropped to 43% and 28% 
respectively. For 135 companies that listed on the main markets in France, Germany and 
Italy during the same period, the pre and post gearing was 34%. This indicates that for 
France, firms on the small capitalization exchange had higher gearing than firms on the 
main market. Burghof and Hunger (2004) report that the gearing of firms before they listed 
on the Neuer Markt was 70%, while the corresponding figure for firms listing on other 
German markets was 73%, which is consistent with the results of Bottazzi & Rin (2002) for 
Germany. 
•  Venture capitalists are more likely to be involved with firms listed on AIM, and they may 
create price volatility when they end their involvement. However, the level of involvement of 
venture capitalists in Germany is lower than in the US. Vitols (2000) argues that the Neuer 
Markt was not creating companies similar to those of Silicon Valley because there was 
much less involvement of venture capitalists in Neuer Markt firms, and these firms were 
older and more profitable than those in Silicon Valley. 
•  A trading mechanism involving market makers produces bid-ask bounce, leading to a more 
volatile prices than if prices are set by an order-driven process (e.g. SETS, SETS-MM). 
Since small firms on AIM use market makers, while some firms on the OL use an auction 
mechanism (where bid-ask bounce between market maker quotes is absent), AIM price 
volatility will be higher.  
•  If the distribution of returns for shares listed on AIM is more negatively skewed than for 
shares in the OL, there will be more big negative returns on AIM, and this may give the 
impression that AIM is riskier.  
 
Risk is usually measured in two alternative ways:- (a) total risk, and (b) systematic risk (or beta). 
Total risk is simply the variability of returns on the company’s shares. Systematic risk measures 
the extent to which a firm’s returns move with those of the market as a whole.  
 
A number of empirical studies have investigated the change in the systematic risk (or beta) of a 
company’s shares when it moves from a small capitalization exchange to the main market, or 
lists for the first time on the main market. These studies appear in table A5, and all but one are 
for the US. There is no evidence from any of these studies that a change in listing affects 
systematic risk. This indicates that the additional visibility and bonding (i.e. agreeing to comply ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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with the regulations) of the main exchange do not reduce systematic risk. The evidence is 
limited, and none is for AIM, but it suggests that the tougher listing requirements of the main 
exchange do not lead to a drop in systematic risk. If this result applies in the UK, it implies that 
whether a firm is included in the OL or listed on AIM has no effect on systematic risk.  
 
Study Authors  Small Cap Market Studied 
Reints & Vandenberg (1975)  OTC or AMEX to NYSE 
Ying, Lewellen, Scharbaum  
& Lease (1977)  OTC to AMEX or NYSE 
Fabozzi & Hershkoff (1979)   OTC to AMEX 
Fabozzi (1981)  OTC to AMEX 
Prakash, Parhizgari & Perritt (1989)  OTC to NYSE 
Bacmann, Dubois & Ertur (2002)  Marché  au  Comptant  or  Second  Marché  to 
Marché à Règlement Mensuel 
  Table A5: Studies of the Change in Listing on Systematic Risk 
 
If firms listed on AIM are riskier than those on the OL, this extra risk may be priced, i.e. expected 
returns on AIM stocks are higher than for firms on the OL, and this compensates for the higher 
AIM risk. In support of this view, Schulman (1999) describes small capitalization firms as having 
greater price volatility, default risk and price manipulation risk, but expected returns are higher to 
compensate for these increased risks. 
 
In the course of studying other aspects of small capitalization exchanges, some researchers 
have reported volatility measures. These are comparisons of total, not systematic, risk.  
•  Board, Vila and Wells (1998) computed the average standard deviation of trade to trade 
price changes for 111 AIM stocks over a six month period in 1996. This was 5.19%. Using 
the standard deviation of daily closing prices, Board et al found that larger AIM companies 
were less volatile than smaller AIM companies. Sixty seven AIM firms were previously 
traded under rule 4.2, and these firms had a much higher volume of trading, and a slightly 
lower volatility when traded on AIM than under rule 4.2. [Rule 4.2 (previously rule 535.2) 
permitted unquoted stocks to be traded off-exchange.]  
•  Franzke and Schlag (2003) computed the volatility of daily returns for the 20 days after 
listing on the Neuer Markt, and obtained an annualized volatility of 78%. which is equivalent 
to an annualized volatility of 83%. Since a typical volatility of a stock on a main exchange is 
about 30%, this small cap volatility is very high.  
•  Kraus (2002) computed the standard deviation of daily returns for the 20 days after an IPO 
on the Neuer Markt, and this was about 0.062. On an annualized basis, this is equivalent to 
a volatility of 99%, and is again very high.  
•  Wagner (2004) examined the daily returns for ten firms after they were listed on the Neuer 
Markt. For each of the two years after listing, the average standard deviation of daily returns 
was 0.015. This is equivalent to an annualized standard deviation of 24%, which is on the 
low side. They also found that daily returns on these firms exhibited positive skewness, i.e. 
a long upper tail, indicating considerable upside risk, which is desirable to investors.  
•  Nowak (2004) computed the standard deviations of daily price changes for 142 firms traded 
on the Neuer Markt during the period 1997-9, and the mean value was 4.37%. This is 
equivalent to an annualized volatility of 70%. 
•  Leuz (2003) reported the standard deviation of share prices for 1999 and 2000 at between 
0.036 and 0.042, but it is unclear how these numbers were computed. 
•  Uno, Shimatani, Shimizu and Mannen (2002) computed the standard deviation of daily price 
changes for JASDAQ stocks in 2001. The volatility for the order driven stocks was 8.0%, 
while that for those stocks traded using market makers was 6.3%. These are equivalent to 
annual volatilities of 127% and 100%, respectively.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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Lee, Rui and Wang (2004) presented data comparing the total risk of the main market with that 
of the corresponding small capitalization exchange. Table A6 shows the annualized standard 
deviation of returns for five small capitalization Asian exchange indices, and the corresponding 
main market indices. The table shows that small cap indices have substantially lower volatility 
than individual stocks, which is only to be expected as they are portfolios.  
 




















GEM  45.7%  Negative  Hang Seng  30.0%  None  53% 
JASDAQ  26.1%  Negative  Nikkei 225  24.1%  None    9% 
KOSDAQ  40.2%  Negative  KOSPI  43.4%  None  −7% 
SESDAQ  31.9%  Positive  Strait Times  22.6%  Positive  41% 
TAISDAQ  36.7%  None  Taiwan  28.5%  None  28% 
 
  Table A6: Annualized Standard Deviation of Daily Returns  
 
For every market, apart from South Korea where main market volatility was high, the small cap 
index is more volatile than the large cap index. Across all five markets, the small cap exchanges 
were 25% more volatile than the corresponding main exchange. This accords with expectations, 
as no attempt has been made to control for the wide range of factors which make small cap firms 
riskier than large cap firms. For three markets (Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea) the 
distribution of returns on the small cap market is negatively skewed, i.e. a long lower tail, 
indicating considerable downside risk, which is undesirable to investors. For main market 
returns, the only skewness is positive skewness in Singapore.  
 
A4 Other empirical studies 
There have been some further studies of small cap exchanges which do not fall into any of the 
above categories. 
•  Lee, Rui and Wang (2004) investigated return and volatility spillovers from NASDAQ to five 
small  capitalization  exchanges  in  Asia:  SESDAQ  (Singapore),  TAISDAQ  (Taiwan), 
KOSDAQ (S. Korea), JASDAQ (Japan) and GEM (Hong Kong). They found that NASDAQ 
returns and return volatility leads those in these five Asian small cap exchanges; and that 
returns and return volatility in the main exchange lead those of the corresponding small cap 
exchange. Kim and Kim (2003) showed that the NASDAQ index led both the JASDAQ and 
KOSDAQ  indices  by  one  or  two  days.  These  results  indicate  that  prices  on  small 
capitalization exchanges are related to both the corresponding main market and to the world 
financial system. 
•  Companies must seek to align the incentives of managers with those of the shareholders; 
and in a study of AIM Roosenboom (2004) investigated the determinants of the managerial 
incentives offered to managers of companies undertaking an IPO.  
•  Kutsuna, Okamura and Cowling (2002) used primarily accounting data to study the effects 
of  the  pre-  and  post-IPO  ownership  structure  on  the  performance  of  firms  listed  on 
JASDAQ. 
•  Leuz (2003) found that the choice of international accounting standards (IAS) or US 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accounts by firms listed on the Neuer 
Markt had no effect on their bid-ask spread, traded volume or IPO underpricing.  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2006-01 
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•  McCaffrey and Hamill (2000) studied the market reaction to the decision to start paying 
dividends after firms had listed on the USM or the OL. For the OL companies, the initiation 
of dividends signalled improved future prospects, but this was not the case for the USM 
stocks. In consequence, USM companies had a smaller price reaction to dividend initiation 
than did OL companies. 




This review has found over fifty empirical studies of small capitalization exchanges, and these 
have focused on the members of Euro.NM, particularly the Neuer Markt. For the UK, there have 
been five studies of the USM and two of techMARK, all of which used share price data. Two 
studies of AIM have relied primarily on prospectuses and accounting data, and there is only one 
previous study of AIM using share price data. Only one previous study has investigated the 
relative riskiness of large and small cap exchanges - Lee, Rui and Wang (2004). This examined 
market indices, and found that Asian small cap exchanges were about 25% more volatile than 
the corresponding main exchange. In addition, a number of studies have reported the volatility of 
selected stocks on small cap exchanges. These volatilities appear to be rather high, but no 
directly  comparable  volatilities  for  similar  stocks  on  the  main  market  are  available  for 
comparison. 
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